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6.1 The contribution of SLCPs to climate 
change – Introduction and framing
This chapter outlines the opportunities to reduce the 
emissions gap afforded by limiting emissions of short-lived 
climate pollutants (SLCPs). This is a topic that has not been 
included in previous Emissions Gap Reports.
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction policies 
contribute to varying degrees to reducing emissions of SLCPs: 
while methane sources are covered, black carbon sources 
are only partially covered (for example, through policies 
to regulate emissions from diesel engines). In light of this, 
and given that SLCPs have a relatively short residence time 
in the atmosphere, implementing targeted SLCP reduction 
measures can provide rapid reductions in global warming. 
For this reason, this chapter focuses on measures that are 
specific to SLCPs.
Anthropogenic climate change is largely driven by human-
induced changes in the composition of the atmosphere, 
including long-lived GHGs (that have lifetimes of 
approximately eight years or more) and short-lived climate 
pollutants (that have lifetimes of approximately 20 years 
or less) (Myhre et al., 2013)1. The most recent assessment 
report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) found that increases in carbon dioxide (CO
2
) were the 
largest single contributor to climate change. However, other 
compounds also play large roles and, for this reason, it is 
standard practice to include all climate drivers in analyses 
of historical and projected trends2. In sum, although some 
SLCPs — particularly black carbon — are not explicitly part 
1 These groupings of pollutants by lifetime are consistent with the IPCCs Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5), and methane is included within both groups.
2 This extends to allowable carbon budgets, for which the IPPC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report presented analyses for both CO₂ alone and all climate 
drivers.
of the Paris Agreement, which targets long-lived GHGs only, 
SLCPs are routinely included in analyses aimed to identify 
emission trajectories that are consistent with temperature 
targets.
This report defines the ‘emissions gap’ as the difference 
between the emission trajectories resulting from 
implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), and the trajectories associated with emission 
scenarios that are consistent with temperature targets, such 
as the 2°C target. For some SLCPs, however, such a definition 
is problematic. For example, emissions of black carbon can 
increase relative to current policies under a 2°C pathway, 
due to a greater reliance on biofuels, or growing numbers of 
diesel vehicles without particulate filters and/or stringent fuel 
quality standards. In light of this, the definition of ‘emissions 
gap’ that applies to this chapter is “the difference between 
emission levels that are consistent with emission trajectories 
resulting from NDC implementation, and the lowest emission 
levels achievable using current mitigation technologies and 
policies”. For methane and hydrofluorocarbons, results 
are presented in CO₂ equivalents (CO₂e). Additionally, the 
temperature response associated with mitigation measures 
covering all SLCPs is presented3.
Strategies to reduce SLCPs will typically target methane, 
tropospheric ozone, black carbon and hydrofluorocarbons. 
Other short-lived climate forcers, such as sulphur dioxide 
and organic carbon, lead to cooling and are therefore not 
targeted. These SLCP reduction strategies will sometimes 
affect only a single pollutant, for example intermittent 
rice irrigation affects methane alone. Nonetheless, most 
strategies to reduce SLCPs will affect multiple pollutants. 
It follows that an evaluation of mitigation measures must 
3 The analysis presented in this chapter cannot assess the emissions gap in 
terms of national pledges, as most countries pledged reductions in CO₂e.
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examine emissions of both long-lived GHGs and all SLCPs, to 
assess the net impact on warming.
Sustained SLCP reduction strategies can help limit long-term 
warming, especially when combined with CO₂ reduction, and 
therefore contribute to closing the emissions gap. A complete 
separation between SLCP and CO₂ reductions is not possible 
for two reasons. Firstly, decarbonization strategies will 
lead to a reduction of some SLCPs, including black carbon, 
about one third of which originates from fossil fuel sources 
(Bond et al., 2013; Klimont et al., 2017). Secondly, efficiency 
increases can reduce all types of emissions, but many SLCP 
mitigation strategies are distinct from strategies to reduce 
CO2, especially in the near term, as many decarbonization 
measures require lengthy structural changes. 
Reductions in SLCPs have the potential to decrease the rate 
and degree of warming in the next few decades, with SLCP 
mitigation having a rapid effect on temperature. In contrast, 
reducing CO2 (and associated emissions, which often include 
cooling agents such as sulphur dioxide or nitrogen oxides) 
tends to reduce warming more slowly. Hence, the climate 
impact of mitigating SLCPs is not equivalent to reducing CO2, 
which is a much longer-lived GHG, owing to the differing 
temporal evolution of the radiative forcing response to these 
emissions (Myhre et al., 2013). It has been estimated that 
SLCP mitigation has the potential to avoid up to 0.6°C of 
warming by mid-century (for example Hu et al., 2013; Rogelj 
et al., 2014; Shindell et al., 2012), while aggressive CO₂ 
mitigation in a comparable scenario leads to less than half 
as much near-term reduction in warming (Hu et al., 2013). 
SLCPs will also affect long-term global mean temperatures. 
In that context, the impact of sustained emissions changes 
of SLCPs can be usefully compared with pulse emission 
changes of long-lived GHGs (Allen et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
existing air quality and CO₂ mitigation policies will reduce 
emissions of sulphate and nitrogen oxides, which will drive 
up warming in the near term (despite improving air quality). 
Enhancing SLCP mitigation measures can help counteract 
this unmasked warming.
When considering opportunities to reduce the emissions 
gap, it is also important to consider how the measures and 
strategies adopted to cover the temperature gap will affect 
societies, human well-being and health, as well as ecosystems. 
The text of the Paris Agreement commits the world to 
an ambitious long-term temperature target (Article 2a 
and 4.1), but places this ambition within the context of 
“sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.” 
Through the lens of sustainable development, the path that 
the world choses to reach the long-term climate target is 
as important as achieving the target itself, particularly for 
those that are already suffering from the impacts of climate 
change (Shindell et al., 2017a). 
In this context, near-term mitigation of SLCPs is perhaps 
even more important. In addition to the fast temperature 
response, reductions of SLCPs would contribute to reducing 
climate change impacts that are based on cumulative heat 
uptake (for example, sea-level rise, and glacier and ice 
sheet melting). They would also help reduce the likelihood 
of passing irreversible thresholds and triggering large 
positive feedbacks. In doing so, they would strengthen other 
climate change mitigation efforts (Shindell et al., 2017a; Xu 
and Ramanathan, 2017). SLCP reductions also improve air 
quality, with benefits for human health, agricultural yields, 
rainfall stability and other environmental and social policy 
goals (section 6.5).
 
Finally, cutting levels of black carbon and other SLCPs 
delivers short-term benefits, which may help governments 
to increasingly view collective action on climate change as 
feasible (Victor et al., 2015). Capitalizing on efforts such as 
the Climate and Clean Air Coalition or the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer can increase the 
momentum for climate change mitigation (Sabel and Victor, 
2015).
6.2 Recent SLCP emissions trends and 
outlook towards 2030
Efforts to estimate emissions of SLCPs and their future trends 
have intensified, following a global assessment of emission 
trends for black carbon and tropospheric ozone precursors 
(UNEP/WMO, 2011). Many recent studies have focused on 
improving the understanding about emissions from poorly 
quantified sources4, with a secondary focus on large emitting 
regions5.
6.2.1. Historical estimates
Recent work has led to revised global estimates of SLCP 
emissions (Crippa et al., 2016; Höglund-Isaksson, 2017; 
Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017; Klimont et al., 2017; Purohit 
and Höglund-Isaksson, 2017; Wang et al., 2014), and to the 
re-estimation of historical emissions of SLCPs that were 
used to develop the Representative Concentration Pathways 
(Lamarque et al., 2010) and Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathways (Rao et al., 2017)6. While estimates of SLCP 
emissions remain uncertain, the revised historical estimates 
are higher than previously assumed (Hoesly et al., 2017; 
Klimont et al., 2017). This is especially important with regard 
to black carbon, where the inclusion of emissions from 
kerosene lamps, open burning of waste, gas flaring, and 
regional data on coal use in China results in emission levels 
that are over a million tonnes (over 15 percent) higher in 
2010 than in the integrated assessment models used in the 
4 These include black carbon from kerosene lamps (Jacobson et al., 2013; 
Lam et al., 2012), gas flaring (Conrad and Johnson, 2017; Stohl et al., 2013; 
Weyant et al., 2016), brick manufacturing (Cardenas et al., 2012; Maithel et 
al., 2012; Weyant et al., 2014), open burning of residential waste (Christian 
et al., 2010; Wiedinmyer et al., 2014), open burning of agricultural residues 
(Stockwell et al. (2016), and methane from the oil and gas industry (Höglund-
Isaksson, 2017).
5 Notably China, India, Russia and the Arctic (Evans et al., 2017, 2015; Huang et 
al., 2015; Kholod et al., 2016; Kondo et al., 2011; Kurokawa et al., 2013; Lu et 
al., 2011; Shen et al., 2012; Winiger et al., 2017).
6 See Hoesly et al. (2017) for additional details concerning past trends on 
anthropogenic emissions of reactive gases and aerosols.
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Representative Concentration Pathways and Shared Socio-
Economic Pathways scenarios7. 
Asia’s role in emissions of black carbon and methane is 
ever-increasing, while North America and Europe (including 
Russia) combined represented nearly one third of global 
methane emissions in 2010, primarily via emissions from the 
oil and gas sector. Although sectoral structures of emissions 
vary greatly across pollutants, a few sectors tend to 
dominate. For black carbon, residential combustion (cooking 
and heating in solid fuel stoves) has been a key source of 
emissions, with transport and industry gaining importance 
in recent years (Hoesly et al., 2017).
6.2.2. Projected emissions (including NDCs)
Within Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 
identifying particular compounds is usually difficult or 
impossible. This is because emissions reduction targets 
are expressed in CO
2
e, often without specific targets for 
methane, hydrofluorocarbons or black carbon, but rather 
providing a list of target sectors. Only Mexico, Chile, Nigeria 
and Canada name SLCPs (black carbon) in their NDCs (and 
only Mexico specifies a target)8. It follows that NDCs are 
unsuited to analyses of SLCP projections. For this reason, 
the assessment below relies upon air pollutant and GHG 
emissions modelling that provides pollutant-specific 
estimates.
Recent projections of black carbon emissions indicate a 
change in trends (figure 6.1), driven by legislation developed 
to address primarily the health impacts of particulate matter9. 
Following the introduction of diesel particulate filters, black 
carbon emissions from diesel engines in OECD countries 
have continued to decline since about 2005. A similar impact 
is expected in developing countries, where comparable 
legislation has been recently introduced (DieselNet, 2015; 
GOI, 2014; MoRTH, 2016) in addition to measures to reduce 
smoke exposure among rural populations cooking with 
biomass and using kerosene for lighting (Venkataraman 
et al., 2010). Finally, China’s policy to reduce coal use in 
households and small industries is likely to play an important 
role in near-future emissions of black carbon.
Recent scenarios reflect these policies to curb emissions 
of black carbon. figure 6.1 shows how projected emissions 
of black carbon (and methane and hydrofluorocarbons) 
7 A recent study by Höglund-Isaksson (2017) reports a considerably higher 
release of methane and ethane from global oil and gas systems for the period 
1980 to 2012, with oil production emerging as a much larger contributor 
than natural gas production. The results of this study show much closer 
consistency between bottom-up and top-down estimates of global ethane 
emissions from fossil sources than existing bottom-up inventories (EC-JRC/
PBL, 2013; US EPA, 2012).
8 By 2030, Mexico aims to achieve a 51 percent reduction in emissions of 
black carbon, compared to the country’s emissions levels in 2013. This 
is an ambitious goal, requiring significant reductions in transport (over 
70 percent), residential combustion (nearly 60 percent), and industry 
(50 percent), and the enforcement of a ban on open burning of residues 
(INDC-Mexico, 2015). Beyond developing the strategy, the government 
issued new legislation regarding the transport sector requiring improved 
efficiency and emission standards.
9 Reductions in emissions of black carbon is an ancillary benefit of policies 
aimed to curb particulate matter emissions.
compare with Shared Socio Economic Pathways scenarios10. 
In addition to the three Shared Socio-Economic Pathways 
scenario ranges, an ‘updated policy’ pathway is shown, 
reflecting the latest policy assessments11. In the period prior 
to 2030, this pathway is consistent with all the Shared Socio-
Economic Pathways trajectories associated with a radiative 
forcing of 2.6 Watts/m2 (which corresponds to a 2°C increase 
in global mean temperature at the end of this century). 
After 2030, the ‘updated policy’ pathway is consistent with 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 trajectories 
associated with a radiative forcing of 3.4 Watts/m2. Unlike 
recent estimates, the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – 
narrative 3 (reference - no mitigation) scenario does not 
include the most recent policies in the transport sector. 
Considering the latest developments with respect to diesel 
engines (notably stricter standards, bans in cities, and 
the development of alternative propulsion systems), the 
projected decline in emissions from diesel engines over the 
next decades appears plausible. Finally, it is worth noting 
that the estimated near-term baseline developments do not 
consider some of the ongoing discussion that could bring 
further commitments to reduce SLCP emissions12. 
10 The figure shows projected emission ranges for three Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathways scenario groups. Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 
(reference - no mitigation) assumes a focus on national and regional policies, 
slow economic growth, lack of collaboration, large population remaining 
in poverty, and low priority for environmental policies, leading to strong 
environmental degradation in some regions. Shared Socio-Economic Pathway 
– narrative 3 (3.4 Watts/m2) assumes the same socio-economic pathways, 
except that they include aggressive policies to curb climate change. Shared 
Socio-Economic Pathways 1-5 (2.6 Watts/m2) trajectories are consistent with 
the 2°C target that is achieved for all Shared Socio-Economic Pathways except 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 (reference – no mitigation) 
(Rao et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017).
11 Updates include recent emission legislation (as of 2015) and updated energy 
projections, as described in IEA (2016).
12 Four commitments are especially significant:
 •  The member states of the Arctic Council have pledged to reduce black 
carbon emissions by between 25 percent and 33 percent of 2013 levels by 
2025.
 •  Black carbon is covered by the Gothenburg Protocol to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution. While no specific target is set, the Convention 
requires parties to prioritize important sources of black carbon emissions in 
their strategies to reduce emissions of particulate matter.
 •  The International Maritime Organization is considering options to reduce 
emissions of black carbon from the maritime industry.
 •  Thirty-eight partner countries to the Climate and Clean Air Coalition have 
pledged to develop or refine inventories of black carbon (55 countries are 
now partners in the coalition, which targets SLCPs, including black carbon). 
Other non-state actors have also made commitments, with the state of 
California in the United States adopting specific legal targets for reductions 
of each of the major SLCPs.
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For methane and hydrofluorocarbons, the baseline 
trajectories (labelled ‘current policy’ in figure 6.1) relying 
on near-term energy projections (IEA, 2016; Purohit and 
Höglund-Isaksson, 2017) appear similar to the Shared Socio-
Economic Pathway – narrative 3 trajectories. Numerous 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (including the top three global consumers of 
hydrofluorocarbons, China, the United States and European 
Union) are already taking action to reduce emissions through 
national policies and legislation. In their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions INDCs/NDCs, 99 countries 
pledged to reduce emissions of hydrofluorocarbons13.
 
6.2.3. Impact of the Kigali Amendment
A 2015 study found that phasing down hydrofluorocarbons 
could avoid between 4.0 GtCO
2
e and 5.3 GtCO
2
e per year 
by 2050, compared to a reference scenario (Velders et al., 
2015). A related study from 2017, which uses more up-to-
13 Three sets of initiatives are worth noting:
• In May 2014, as part of an action plan to implement the energy conservation 
and emission reduction targets of its 12th five-year plan, the State Council of 
China announced that it would strengthen emission reduction requirements 
for hydrofluorocarbons, and accelerate their phase-out and replacement. 
In its INDC/NDC, China has stated that it will completely phase out 
hydrofluorocarbon-123.
• The European Union’s regulation 842/2006 on fluorinated greenhouse 
gases, which entered into effect on 1 January 2015, envisages that, by 2030, 
hydrofluorocarbon levels will have reduced by 79 percent of the levels 
registered in the period between 2009 and 2012.
• The United States considered federal-level measures to reduce the 
manufacture and use of hydrofluorocarbons. In August 2017, a court struck 
down part of a 2016 decision by the country’s Environmental Protection 
Agency, which sought to revoke approval for several of the most potent 
hydrofluorocarbons. However, it is unclear how much impact this ruling will 
have, as it returned the decision to the Agency, for further justification. In 
parallel, several state administrations in the United States are regulating 
hydrofluorocarbons. For example, California has set a new emissions 
reductions target for hydrofluorocarbons (a 40 percent reduction to 2013 
levels by 2030).
date assumptions about emission reduction policies and 
a revised reference scenario, found that full compliance 
with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol 
could reduce global hydrofluorocarbon emissions by 0.7 
Gt CO
2
e per year by 2030, and up to 2.7 Gt CO
2
e per year 
by 2050 (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). This would avoid 
cumulative emissions of 39 GtCO
2
e between 2018 and 2050 
(figure 6.1)14. Strengthening phase-down efforts (that is, 
pursuing a reduction in emissions that goes beyond that 
afforded by the implementation of the Kigali Amendment 
and that seeks to reach the maximum potential) could 
provide about 30 percent greater cumulative benefits 
(figure 6.1), while avoiding additional future emissions by 
precluding a build-up of storage hydrofluorocarbon banks 
(Velders et al., 2014).
In addition to efforts to avoid direct emissions of 
hydrofluorocarbons, additional indirect CO
2
e mitigation 
is likely through parallel improvements in the energy 
efficiency of refrigeration and air-conditioning appliances 
and equipment. Past phase-outs under the Montreal 
Protocol have catalysed significant improvements in the 
energy efficiency of appliances — up to 30 percent in some 
subsectors (US EPA, 2002). Höglund-Isaksson et al. (2017) 
found that full compliance with the Kigali Amendment 
could reduce global electricity consumption by between 
14 These estimates are based on a 100-year global warming potential.
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Figure 6.1: Global annual emissions of methane, black carbon (including forest and savannah fires) and hydrofluorocarbons.
Note: For black carbon, values are shown in million tonnes and also based upon conversion to CO
2
e using 20-year global warming potentials (Bond et al., 2013). For 
methane and hydrofluorocarbons, the values shown are based upon conversion to CO
2
e using both 100-year (left axis) and 20-year (right axis) global warming potentials, 
to highlight the dependence of comparisons between SLCPs and CO
2
 on the choice of metric. Note that a 100-year global warming potential of 21 is used for methane, 
for consistency with prior issues of the ‘emissions gap report’, even though current studies and IPCC assessments use values more than 60 percent higher (Gasser et al., 
2017; Myhre et al., 2013).
Source: The figures were developed using data from Shared Socio Economic Pathways database (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd), Riahi et al. (2017) and data 
for policy and mitigation scenarios from the GAINS model (http://gains.iiasa.ac.at) documented in Klimont et al. (2017); Stohl et al. (2015), and Purohit and Höglund-
Isaksson (2017).
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0.2 percent and 0.7 percent over the period 2018 to 2050, due 
to the adoption of more energy-efficient technologies15,16.
6.3 SLCP mitigation potential
Some of the reduction potential for black carbon identified 
in early studies (Shindell et al., 2012; UNEP/WMO, 2011) is 
expected to be realized in the updated baselines (Section 6.2). 
Nonetheless, significant additional opportunities exist, 
which could reduce black carbon emissions by about 
70 percent by 2030 (and more, in the longer term) (figure 
6.1). Provided that strong targeted SLPC policies are 
introduced, these reductions in emissions could be achieved 
quickly17. While the illustrated potential was estimated for 
an energy scenario with CO
2
 emission levels similar to the 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 trajectory, the 
shown potential appears comparable with, or even larger 
than, the strict climate mitigation strategies that assume 
significant structural changes in the energy system. However, 
these strict climate policy scenarios are not compatible 
with the socio-economic developments associated with 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3. Therefore, 
the intermediate climate target scenario results (reaching a 
3.4 Watts/m2 forcing level, or approximately a concentration 
of 550 ppm of CO
2
) were added. These results illustrate the 
co-benefits of climate policies on black carbon emissions. 
Indeed, under this scenario emissions are reduced by about 
30 percent by 2050, compared to the Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathway – narrative 3 trajectory.
Any further mitigation of black carbon emissions would 
require either tightened air quality standards, and/or 
strengthened development policy. These are included in 
the SLCP mitigation case, and in the strict climate policies 
case (as shown in the 2.6 Watts/m2 scenarios). By 2030, very 
limited reduction is demonstrated in this scenario, contrary 
to the SLCP mitigation case, where effective technological 
solutions and tested policy approaches afford much larger 
emission reduction potentials. In general, the new global 
set of scenarios (Shared Socio Economic Pathways) shows a 
fairly large span of emissions, even within the same Shared 
Socio Economic Pathways (Rao et al., 2017). This differs from 
the Representative Concentration Pathways data set, where 
assumptions that economic growth automatically leads to 
decreases in pollution were uniformly used across all the 
models for projecting changes in emissions of air pollutants, 
including SLCPs (Amann et al., 2013).
15 This would result in a cumulative reduction of about 5.5 GtCO₂e due to 
electricity savings when using country-specific emission factors that take into 
account country-specific transformation and distribution losses (Brander et 
al., 2011).
16 A 2015 study suggested that, in the air conditioning sector alone, improving 
the energy efficiency of equipment by 30 percent, while simultaneously 
transitioning to alternatives with low global warming potential, could provide 
cumulative mitigation of nearly 100 GtCO₂e by 2050 (Shah et al., 2015).
17 Past experience on a regional and local scale exists, demonstrating fast 
and effective implementation, provided that appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms are set in place along the regulation; several examples are 
provided in, for example, Coaen (2012); Klimont et al. (2017); Kodjak (2015); 
Saikawa (2013); Shindell et al. (2012).
In the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 
scenarios, the global technical mitigation potential for 
methane is estimated at about 45 percent by 2030, provided 
that an appropriate policy environment is introduced18. 
Most of the emission reduction opportunities are in the 
exploration and distribution of coal, oil and gas, and in the 
waste sector19. The reductions available are comparable with 
those in the deep climate mitigation scenarios (figure 6.1). In 
general, policies to reduce emissions of CO
2
 will effectively 
cover a large portion of methane emissions.
Technical measures could bring about fast and significant 
reductions in emissions of black carbon and methane (for 
example Amann et al., 2013; Höglund-Isaksson, 2012; 
Klimont et al., 2017)20. However, introducing such measures 
has proven problematic in some instances. For example, 
programmes that focus on substituting cooking stoves with 
clean alternatives have often had disappointing results, 
with declining penetration rates over time (Aggarwal 
and Chandel, 2004; Pine et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mercado et al., 
2011; Venkataraman et al., 2010; Wickramasinghe, 2011)21.
Nevertheless, some other types of programmes have been 
successful, including emissions reduction strategies for 
motor vehicles, such as those focused on diesel particulate 
filters or emissions standards (CAI-Asia, 2011; Chambliss et 
al., 2013; Coan, 2012; Kodjak, 2015; Saikawa, 2013; US EPA, 
2017).
This chapter presents estimates of technical mitigation 
potentials, since they are more widely used, and therefore 
more abundant, than estimates of economic mitigation 
potentials. Notwithstanding, it is acknowledged that 
economic potentials may be more relevant with regard to 
understanding the political feasibility of mitigation actions22.
18 In figure 6.1 this is coded ‘maximum reduction’, and represented by the 
following symbol: .
19 The emissions reduction potential associated with rice and anaerobic 
digestion is only significant in certain regions.
20 Emission reduction rates would be faster than those brought about by 
transformational changes associated with low CO₂ strategies.
21 Nonetheless, locally tailored projects, often embedded in a larger scale policy 
process, and coupled with awareness-raising efforts, have proven successful 
(GACC, 2015; Sinton et al., 2004; Thomas et al., 2015). Political feasibility 
depends strongly on the design of the programme, its local sustainability, the 
strong involvement of local stakeholders, and on the incentives for national 
governments to act.
22 The economic potential of SLCP mitigation differs substantially from the 
technical potential of CO₂ mitigation for two main reasons: (i) the total 
benefits of SLCP mitigation are typically larger, because they include non-
climate benefits; and (ii) with SLCP mitigation, a large share of the benefits is 
nationally appropriable, in particular for black carbon. Shindell et al. (2017b) 
estimate that the social cost of methane (that is, the monetized societal 
damages resulting from a tonne of emissions incorporating climate and air 
quality related impacts) is 50 to 100 times greater than the corresponding 
social cost of CO₂. Estimates of the net benefits that are nationally 
appropriable are not yet available in the literature. Research programmes are 
ongoing to bridge this research gap.
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6.3.1 Methane
The technical mitigation potential identified through the 
integrated assessment models used to develop Shared Socio-
Economic Pathways scenarios draws primarily on the work 
of United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA, 
2013). The estimates for methane have been further updated 
(Höglund-Isaksson, 2012; UNEP/WMO, 2011) to include 
explicit consideration of unconventional gas production, 
new regional characteristics for oil and gas production 
(Höglund-Isaksson, 2017), and waste management. For coal 
production, a structural update was made, to allow for the 
separate estimation of emissions and mitigation potentials 
from pre-mining operations (de-gasification), mining 
operations (ventilation air methane oxidation), and post-
mining activities. Finally, current model implementation 
includes impacts of animal feed and manure management 
options as described in FAO (2013), but does not include 
changes in consumer preferences or behaviour, which could 
add mitigation potentials in the agricultural sector through 
reduced consumption of meat (especially beef) and reduced 
food waste generation (Stehfest et al. (2009) (Chapter 4). 
Figure 6.2 shows regional estimates of ‘Current policy’ 
emission trajectories and reduction potentials in the coming 
decades. These estimates are consistent with International 
Energy Agency projections of energy use (IEA, 2012), and 
integrate the refinements highlighted above23.
Mitigation potentials vary across regions, and are often 
characterized by a dominating source sector24. Nonetheless, 
solid waste separation and treatment offers opportunities 
across all regions. In Europe and Brazil, reduction potentials 
are smaller, as agriculture is the dominating methane 
source, and there are relatively limited technical mitigation 
opportunities. The comparison with the ‘Climate policy’ 
scenario (based on the IEA (2012) 450 ppm CO
2
 mitigation 
strategy) shows that most of the near-term emissions 
reduction potential appears to require dedicated SLCP 
measures.
23 In terms of CO₂ emission levels, the International Energy Agency’s scenario is 
comparable to Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 (reference - no 
mitigation) and ‘Current policy’, shown in figure 6.1.
24 For example, capturing ventilation air methane from coal mines represents 
the key mitigation opportunity in China.
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Figure 6.2: Regional baseline methane and black carbon [shaded background] emissions and mitigation potential by 2030 [Mt per year].
Source: The figures were developed using data from the GAINS model (http://gains.iiasa.ac.at) and scenarios documented in Höglund-Isaksson (2012, 2017); Klimont et 
al. (2017); Stohl et al. (2015), with underlying energy scenarios from IEA (2012).
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6.3.2 Black carbon
Figure 6.2 gives estimates of mitigation potentials for black 
carbon in a number of world regions. The estimates reflect 
updates referred to above (Klimont et al., 2017; Stohl et al., 
2015). With regard to black carbon, key updates include 
improved characterisations of the gas flaring sector, kerosene 
lighting, diesel generators, and the brick-manufacturing 
sector.
The ‘Current policy’ trajectory varies greatly between 
regions, depending on the structure of emissions and current 
policies. Consequently, the mitigation potential varies too. 
For the European Union and the United States, a strong 
decline is observed (owing to strict transport legislation), 
which explains the limited mitigation potential that remains. 
In China, the transformation in the coke sector, ever-more 
stringent policies in transport, and reductions of coal use in 
the residential sector lead to significant reductions relative to 
the reference scenario emission levels. Therefore, mitigation 
potential is larger in China than in the European Union and 
the United States. In some of the other regions with a large 
share of emissions from biomass cooking (notably India), 
significant opportunities exist.
While the overall global potential by 2030 was estimated 
at over 70 percent (figure 6.1), the regional potentials 
vary from about 40 percent to over 80 percent. In regions 
where solid fuel cooking and heating dominates emissions 
of black carbon, the emissions reduction potential increases 
significantly beyond 2030 (not shown)25.
6.3.3 Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
Full compliance with the Kigali Amendment would achieve a 
61 percent decrease in hydrofluorocarbon emissions in the 
period between 2018 and 2050, compared to the emission 
levels in a reference scenario (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). 
Transitioning to available low global warming potential 
alternatives faster and more thoroughly than contemplated 
25 This is due to the assumptions made about the effectiveness of cooking stove 
programmes, and the large increases in diesel vehicle emissions in some 
regions.
by the Kigali Amendment represents a major opportunity to 
reduce emissions of hydrofluorocarbons. Such accelerated 
transition is feasible. In countries with high ambient air 
temperatures, almost 70 percent of sectors currently 
using hydrochlorofluorocarbons can leapfrog past high 
global warming potential hydrofluorocarbon refrigerants, 
directly to low global warming potential alternatives with 
equal or better energy efficiency (Zeiger et al., 2014). The 
same study notes that other low global warming potential 
alternatives are in development, and expected to be ready 
to replace the remaining uses by 2025. Höglund-Isaksson 
and colleagues (2017) report that the maximum technical 
abatement potential, relying on existing technologies, 
is 85 percent below the reference scenario emission 
levels (in the period between 2018 and 2050) (figure 6.1). 
They further note that, towards the end of the period, 
the mitigation potential could represent as much as 
98 percent of the annual reference scenario emission 
levels. Interestingly, most of the model realizations of the 
Shared Socio-Economic Pathways scenarios consistent 
with the 2.6 W/m2 trajectories assume even faster and 
steeper reductions than the Kigali Amendment (figure 6.1).
6.4 Implications for the emissions gap
Compared to the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway – 
narrative 3 trajectories, assessments of the impact of 
updated policies show weaker growth or, depending on the 
pollutant, greater decreases in emissions of methane, black 
carbon, organic carbon, and sulphur dioxide (and CO
2
). These 
trends can be translated into likely changes in temperature26. 
Recent policies lead to roughly 0.09 ± 0.04°C less warming 
due to methane, 0.04 ± 0.02°C less warming due to CO
2
, and 
0.17 ± 0.11°C less cooling due to sulphate in 203027. These 
results evidence that, in the near term, the net warming due 
to reductions in CO
2
 and co-emissions (primarily sulphur 
dioxide) is roughly offset by reductions in SLCP, primarily 
methane. Modelling results highlight that SLCP holds a 
substantial additional emission reductions potential, as 
described in section 6.3.
26 To do so, we used the complementary analyses described in Shindell et al. 
(2017b) that included:
• a simple energy-balance calculation, incorporating climate response 
functions based on the CMIP5 models (Geoffroy et al., 2013);
• estimate of the impact of emissions on the carbon cycle (Gasser et al., 2017);
• updated radiative forcing for methane, including shortwave absorption 
(Etminan et al., 2016).
27 Smaller changes due to other pollutants are not reported here.
Table 6.1: Warming mitigation resulting from SLCP emission reductions
Additional SLCP mitigation                              Change in temperature (°C)
2030 2050
All SLCPs (HFCs following the Kigali Amendment) 0.22 ± 0.11 0.59 ± 0.27
Methane 0.09 ± 0.03 0.30 ± 0.12
HFCs following Kigali Amendment 0.005 ± 0.002 0.07 ± 0.02
HFCs Maximum Feasible Reduction 0.02 ± 0.01 0.10 ± 0.03
Black carbon-rich sources 0.1 ± 0.1 0.2 ± 0.2
Note: The estimates in the table represent departures from the estimates associated with the International Energy Agency’s ‘current policies’ scenario (see the main
text for details). HFCs stands for hydrofluorocarbons. HFCs Maximum Feasible Reduction includes Kigali Amendment.
Source: Own elaboration.
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Additional SLCP mitigation could avert a large fraction of 
projected warming over the near term (figure 6.3 and table 
6.1). By 2050, methane reductions contribute the largest 
share (table 6.1). Realizing the maximum emission reduction 
potentials for emissions of hydrofluorocarbons, thus going 
beyond what is envisaged in the Kigali Amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol, would lead to fourfold additional 
savings by 2030 (figure 6.1)28. The remaining half to 
one third of the benefits stem from the net impact 
of the measures targeting black carbon-rich sources.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the near-term mitigation potential for 
black carbon using 20-year global warming potentials. By 
2030, such near-term mitigation potential is roughly three 
quarters that of methane. As noted, however, understanding 
the full impact of measures to mitigate black carbon requires 
an assessment of the impact of all pollutants affected. 
Compared to methane, changes in emissions of black carbon 
lead to faster changes in concentrations of black carbon. 
When the effects of organic carbon and carbon monoxide 
from black carbon-rich sectors are taken into account, the net 
impact on 2030 temperatures is also about three quarters that 
of methane. This fraction decreases over time, as methane 
concentrations adjust more fully to emissions changes. By 
2050, the black carbon mitigation potential is approximately 
two thirds that of methane, but the temperature response is 
just over 50 percent (again, including co-emissions of black 
carbon). This shows that mitigation potentials using 20-year 
global warming potentials can be a useful, but only rough, 
guide to near-term temperature impacts. For the longer 
term, the 2030 additional mitigation potential for methane 
is about 3 GtCO₂e per year (using a 100-year global warming 
28 With hydrofluorocarbons, emissions reductions are phased in early: in 2050, 
additional gains would reach about 30 percent, which represents a much 
more moderate rate in reductions, compared to those achievable by 2030.
potentials of 21), and roughly 5 GtCO
2
e per year (using 
updated 100-year global warming potentials of 34)29. 
The relatively large near-term warming mitigation potentials 
presented above are similar to those in several prior studies. 
Excluding hydrofluorocarbons, they are similar to the 
results presented in (UNEP/WMO, 2011) and Shindell et 
al. (2012). Warming mitigation values are slightly larger in 
2050, consistent with the inclusion of additional mitigation 
measures in this analysis, along with the extension of 
SLCP mitigation through 2050, which offset the decrease 
in benefits associated with the later start in mitigation. 
Including hydrofluorocarbons, values for 2050 are similar to 
those reported elsewhere (Xu et al., 2013)30.
29 A reduction of that magnitude, sustained for 100 years, would be equivalent 
to reducing CO₂ emissions by 170 GtCO₂ in one year (Allen et al., 2016).
30 Other research found smaller warming mitigation from SLCPs, although 
compared to reference cases with reduced SLCP emissions. For example, 
Smith and Mizrahi (2013) used a model that assumed that (i) all control 
measures with a negative cost automatically happen based on ‘rational 
economic behaviour’, and (ii) projected increases in wealth worldwide lead 
to automatic adoption of strict emission control standards. Therefore, in 
essence this study calculated benefits of additional efforts to remove SLCPs 
after many of the available emissions control had already happened. Another 
study explored many possible reference cases, unsurprisingly reporting 
smaller SLCP-related benefits in comparison to reference cases with relatively 
low SLCP emissions, and similar values in comparison with high-SLCP emission 
reference cases akin to those seen in the detailed modelling presented 
above (Section 6.2) (Rogelj et al., 2014). In comparison with reference cases 
incorporating stringent climate mitigation policies focused on CO₂, that 
study found a substantial decrease in the mitigation potential for SLCPs. This 
reflects the overlap mentioned previously between stringent CO₂ controls 
that transition away from fossil fuel use (covering energy-related methane 
emissions and diesel-related black carbon emissions). Those results are 
consistent with the drop in black carbon emissions under the Shared Socio-
Economic Pathway – narrative 3 3.4 W/m2 scenario relative to the Shared 
Socio-Economic Pathway – narrative 3 reference scenario shown in figure 6.1, 
although such scenarios also include structural changes (for example, with 
regard to renewable sources of energy, energy access or electric vehicles), 
and increased energy access for the poor, which may be more difficult to 
realize than technical SLCP control measures, and would likely take longer to 
materialize.
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Given the potential for enhanced SLCP reductions to reduce 
warming substantially in the near term, relative to current 
policies, such reductions could clearly help to close the 
emissions gap defined by long-term global mean annual 
average temperature. They could also help offset near-term 
warming caused by CO₂ mitigation strategies. Near-term 
SLCP mitigation is also a critical lever for slowing the rate 
of change in the next few decades, which is particularly 
important for reducing cumulative climate impacts, such as 
sea-level rise. Hu et al. (2013) found that curbing emissions 
of SLCPs immediately can reduce the rate of sea-level rise 
by approximately 18 percent by 2050, while immediate 
reductions in CO
2
 would yield minimal benefits with regard 
to sea-level rise. Delaying SLCP mitigation by 25 years 
could decrease the impact of both CO
2
 and SLCP mitigation 
on sea-level rise by approximately 30 percent. Not least, 
reducing near-term warming can also decrease risks of low-
probability, high-impact climate change effects (Xu and 
Ramanathan, 2017).
6.5 Implications for the Sustainable 
Development Goals and other policy goals 
This chapter assesses the role of SLCPs, including black 
carbon (a component of particulate matter) and methane, in 
bridging the emissions gap. In addition to the climate change 
mitigation benefits associated with curbing emissions of 
SLCPs, a reduction in emissions of these pollutants would 
contribute significantly to the achievement of several of the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)31. 
The SDGs capture key human and planetary needs and 
challenges, and achieving them by 2030 requires coordinated 
actions on diverse fronts. Implementing SLCP mitigation 
measures can clearly contribute to the achievement of 
multiple SDGs, because of the impact of SLCPs on climate 
change and air pollution32. 
Residential combustion of solid fuels in traditional cooking 
stoves and the use of kerosene for lighting in the Asia-
Pacific and African regions results in very high levels of 
indoor air pollution (Karekezi et al., 2006). The World Health 
Organization has estimated that indoor and ambient air 
pollution cause 6.5 million premature deaths, recognizing 
it as “the single most important environmental health risk 
factor worldwide”, and noting that it is driving a global health 
emergency (WHO, 2016). The provision of modern and 
clean energy forms for meeting these basic requirements, 
particularly those of rural households, would not only help 
reduce the emissions gap, but would also help achieve SDG 3 
on ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being, SDG 4 
31 The majority of black carbon emissions are accounted for by the Asia-
Pacific region (including China), followed by Africa. Emissions come largely 
from residential combustion of fuels and diesel burning in the transport 
sector. Sources of black carbon also emit a large proportion of precursors of 
tropospheric ozone globally. Methane is another significant precursor of the 
increasing background levels of ozone.
32 SLCP mitigation is also complementary to CO₂ mitigation: many SLCP 
mitigation strategies can yield CO₂ mitigation co-benefits, and vice versa 
(Haines and et al., under review).
on ensuring inclusive education, SDG 5 on empowering women 
and girls, and SDG 15 on sustainable forests (Griggs et al., 2014).
Tropospheric ozone is also harmful to human health. Recent 
estimates show that the significance of this pollutant as a 
cause of premature mortality is higher than had previously 
been estimated (Malley et al., 2017). In addition, tropospheric 
ozone is the pollutant that causes the most significant crop 
yield losses. Therefore, early action on sources of SLCPs could 
lead to a rapid reduction in these adverse impacts.
Another key area of global concern is the increasing levels of 
pollution in urban areas. Urbanization is a global megatrend, 
and it is expected that nearly 70 percent of the world’s 
population will be living in urban areas by 2050 (compared 
with 54 percent in 2014). The major causes of urban air 
pollution, namely transportation and industrial activity, are 
also major contributors to SLCP emissions. Improving fuel 
and technology choices in the transport sector, banning 
the open burning of biomass and waste in urban areas, and 
improving energy efficiencies, all contribute to reducing 
SLCPs. In doing so, these initiatives would also contribute to 
achieving several SDGs (Cherian, 2015): SDG 2 on sustainable 
agriculture, SDG 3 on health, SDG 7 on energy, SDG 11 on 
inclusive and sustainable cities, and SDG 12 on sustainable 
production and consumption. 
Actions to reduce SLCP emissions can be synergistic with 
efforts to improve energy efficiency. For example, when 
coupled with energy efficiency policies, measures to phase 
out hydrofluorocarbon-based refrigerants can save between 
340 GW  and 790 GW of peak power load globally, while also 
avoiding about 98 Gt of CO₂ emissions by 2050 (Shah et al., 
2015).
Despite widespread efforts to reduce emissions of several air 
pollutants, especially sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
particulate matter, in several regions air pollution will not 
improve enough to reduce the burden on human health (IEA, 
2016). On the contrary, regional demographics, rising energy 
use and urbanization may lead to growth in the number of 
premature deaths due to outdoor air pollution, especially in 
Asia. However, introducing efficient reduction measures in 
the power sector, industry, and transport, and accelerating 
access to clean energy for cooking — measures that are 
compatible with an SLCP mitigation strategy — could reduce 
the number of premature deaths significantly (IEA, 2016). 
These results are consistent with those of Schmale et al. 
(2014), who estimated that, by halving the concentrations of 
SLCPs in the atmosphere, more than 40 million deaths from 
respiratory and cardiovascular diseases could be avoided by 
2030.
Compared to introducing policies to mitigate SLCPs, 
introducing policies to implement the SDGs is often more 
feasible politically. For this reason, the latter can be used to 
exploit the opportunity of reducing emissions of SLCPs.
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Reductions in emissions of SLCPs offer significant potential 
to slow the rate of near-term warming, contribute to the 
achievement of the long-term Paris Agreement temperature 
targets, improve well-being via improved air quality, and 
facilitate the achievement of several SDGs. Although 
technical control measures already exist and have been 
demonstrated, scaling up those measures to their full 
potential would require dedicated policy efforts beyond 
those embodied in either current policies or low-carbon 
policies. Ideally, by aggressively reducing both SLCPs and 
CO₂, policies would optimize the societal welfare associated 
with efforts to curb climate change, improve air quality and 
achieve sustainable development.
6.6 Key messages
Large reductions in emissions of short-lived climate pollutants 
(SLCPs) are an important part of mitigation efforts in virtually 
all scenarios that meet the 2ᵒC target, and especially those 
that meet the 1.5ᵒC target.
Reductions in SLCP emissions cannot be considered 
equivalent to reductions in long-lived greenhouse gases, as 
many impacts are not directly proportional to global mean 
temperature change at a given point in time. For this reason, 
climate change mitigation policies need to consider these 
two classes of emissions separately.
Early reductions in SLCP emissions would provide substantial 
health benefits, limit the short-term rate of climate change, 
slow self-amplifying feedbacks, and facilitate the achievement 
of the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature target.
Significant SLCP mitigation potential, beyond existing 
commitments, is available via proven technologies. However, 
to unlock that potential requires dedicated policy action to 
strengthen legal frameworks and institutional capacities. 
This is because many SLCP mitigation strategies are distinct 
from strategies to reduce CO
2
 emissions.
Over the period 2018–2050, stringent SLCP reductions 
based on existing, demonstrated technical measures could 
reduce warming by between 0.3ᵒC and 0.9ᵒC relative to 
current emissions projections. Roughly half of the mitigation 
potential is associated with methane, one third with black 
carbon, and the remainder with hydrofluorocarbons. As 
some policies that reduce CO
2
 emissions also reduce SLCP 
emissions, a substantial portion of SLCP reductions could 
be achieved through CO
2
 mitigation efforts. However, 
compared with policies specifically targeting SLCP controls, 
the reductions in SLCP emission resulting from CO
2
 mitigation 
efforts would be slower.
Reduction of SLCP emissions, specifically black carbon, might 
play an important role in mitigating the regional impacts of 
climate change.
